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Volume 7

United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003)
(affirming district court ruling rejecting a motion to void a consent
decree based on a later Supreme Court decision).
In January 1999, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
Rueth Development Company and Harold Rueth (collectively
"Rueth") entered into a consent decree after the EPA issued an
administrative compliance order finding that Rueth had illegally
discharged fill material into wetlands adjacent to water flowing into
navigable waters of the United States. Rueth agreed to restore the
wetlands under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), paid a civil penalty, and
agreed to additional civil penalties if he failed to perform milestone
Although Rueth eventually
tasks within prescribed deadlines.
completed the wetland restoration, he failed to meet deadlines for
performing several of the milestone tasks. The government then
sought enforcement of the stipulated-penalties provision of the decree
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana.
Prior to the district court's ruling, Rueth moved for modification
of the consent decree based on Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
In
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC').
SWANCC, the Supreme Court held CWA jurisdiction did not "extend
to isolated intrastate waters solely because they are used as habitats by
migratory birds." However, since the EPA did not use the "Migratory
Bird Rule" as its basis for jurisdiction in the present case, the district
court found the consent decree valid and granted the government's
motion to enforce the consent decree with penalties.
Rueth then moved to alter the judgment claiming there was no
evidence the wetlands were adjacent to a navigable waterway. The
district court consented that the issue of adjacency remained open to
dispute and thereby vacated that portion of the prior order.
Rueth additionally argued the consent decree did not allow
separate penalties for each uncompleted or delayed milestone. The
district court upheld its award of these penalties and held the
government's regulatory jurisdiction remained because Rueth, in
voluntarily entering into the consent decree, waived the right to
contest. Rueth appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Rueth's SWANCC argument. Rueth then argued there was a lack of
adjacency jurisdiction because the government had not provided
evidence the wetlands were adjacent to navigable waters, the district
court order assumed the wetlands were isolated rather than adjacent,
and the wetlands' link to the navigable waters was too attenuated to
establish adjacency. The court rejected these arguments stating that
because both parties agreed upon the consent decree, the need to
provide such information was not necessary for unanticipated future
litigation. The court also held that Rueth previously waived his right
to litigate this issue by signing the consent decree.
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Rueth then argued it would be unfair for the court to hold him to
the terms of the consent decree because at the time of the original
settlement, unlike the time of the appeal, the government still had the
ability to enforce jurisdiction over isolated waters. The court rejected
this argument stating that at the time of the consent decree, Rueth
weighed his options, calculated the chances of success, and voluntarily
settled the case. The court referred to United States v. Krilich as the
basis for rejecting this argument. In Krilich, the court rejected Krilich's
motion to vacate a consent decree based on SWANCC because the
court believed that to vacate the decree would discourage the
negotiation of settlements and would undermine the finality of such
agreements.
Next, Rueth argued the consent decree's language imposed
cumulative stipulated penalties not for each uncompleted milestone,
but rather for each day of noncompliance, regardless of the number of
violations. The court rejected this argument, stating that the clear
intent of the consent decree was to mandate a restoration in a short
period of time and that if the court were to accept Rueth's
proposition, there would have been no incentive to complete
unfinished milestones if already in violation of others.
The court also rejected Rueth's final arguments that: (1) the
penalties violated due process, (2) the district court erred by failing to
examine whether the EPA consented to the delays, and (3) the district
court should have considered the CWA's statutory criteria for
determining penalties because Rueth voluntarily signed the consent
decree. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.
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NINTH CIRCUIT
County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 02-35512,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16748 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2003) (holding Forest
Service had authority to restrict the use of rights of way to protect
endangered fish under Federal Land Policy and Management Act,
National Forest Management Act, Organic Administration Act, and
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960).
The United States Forest Service ("Forest Service") restricted the
use of the Early Winters Ditch and the Skyline Irrigation Ditch to
maintain instream flow levels for the protection of fish under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington held that the Forest Service had the
authority to place restrictions on rights-of-way permits.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Okanogan County, a company, a partnership and three
individuals (collectively "Okanogan") sought review of the district

